In bowerbirds, males display at bowers but also attempt to destroy the bowers and steal decorations of other males. We develop a game theoretic model to examine optimal marauding behavior in male bowerbirds under the assumption that males have limited amounts of time away from their bower. We model interactions among neighboring males as a stochastic Markovian process and calculate fitness of males as it relates to the amount of time spent marauding. The results are that there are 2 possible evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) profiles: If bower repair time is short (relative to foraging), males should not maraud at all; in contrast, if bower repair time is long, males should maraud at the maximal level. We extend the model in 2 ways: First, allowing for variation in the males' likelihood of mating, the ESS changes when bower repair time is short. The male mostly likely to mate does not maraud at all, whereas his rival marauds at the maximal level. Second, allowing for variation in males' abilities to repair their bower, the ESS for the male that can repair his bower quickly is always to maraud, whereas the ESS for the other male (the male who takes longer to repair his bower) is never to maraud but instead to guard his bower. These results suggest that bower marauding may be a dynamic interaction between males, one that varies with ecological factors, and also that interactions may differ between different sets of males.
INTRODUCTION
I n many species of birds, males attempt to disrupt the display and mating activities of other males (Foster 1983; Trail 1985; Trail and Koutnik 1986; Webster and Robinson 1999) . Although common, such interference behavior is direct in the sense that it occurs when one male sees another male display to or copulate with a female. In general, however, males cannot influence another male's inherent ability to attract females unless the outcome of such interactions influences dominance hierarchies. For example, males often compete for resources required by females, but once a male has secured a territory, other males generally cannot remove the defended resource in order to change the resident's relative attraction as a mate.
The situation is very different in bowerbirds (Ptilonorhynchidae). In 17 of the 20 species of bowerbirds, males build and decorate bowers, physical structures that are the site of display and copulation. Females use the quality of the bower and/ or abundance and type of decorations in their choice of mates (Borgia 1985a (Borgia , 1995 Borgia and Mueller 1992; Lenz 1994; Uy and Borgia 2000; Madden 2003 ). Bowers thus serve as an externalized secondary sexual trait of males (Gilliard 1956; Frith CB and Frith DW 2004) , and the extent to which an externalized object (the bower and its decorations) functions in sexual display in bowerbirds appears unique among all birds.
Not only is the bower external but it also relates to and may determine its owner's potential reproductive success. It is thus not surprising that other males focus their interference behavior on the bower itself. Males attempt to destroy each other's bower, steal each other's decorations, and disrupt actual courtship interactions although this last means of interference, so common in other species (Webster and Robinson 1999) , is rare in bowerbirds (Frith CB and Frith DW 2004) . The threats of bower destruction and decoration theft are sufficiently great that they have likely influenced many aspects of bowerbird behavior, including space use, daily activity patterns, foraging (food caching), and the spatial dispersion of bowers (Pruett-Jones MA and Pruett-Jones SG 1982 , 1985 , PruettJones S and Pruett-Jones M 1994 Miles and Madden 2002; Frith CB and Frith DW 2004) .
The benefit to a male of destroying (partially or completely) the bower of his neighbor is that the neighboring male cannot mate until his bower is repaired. Thus, the mating success of the marauder (either absolute or relative) may increase during this time. Additionally, if a male steals decorations from his neighbor, the thief's bower will be relatively more attractive and that of his neighbor less attractive. There is, however, a cost to a male of attempting to disrupt his neighbor. A male has to leave his own bower unprotected in order to visit his neighbor's bower, and thus, the probability that a male's bower is marauded is increased when that male attempts to disrupt his neighbor.
The benefits of bower marauding are clearly frequency dependent, and as such, the behavior of bower marauding and decoration theft is amenable to theoretical analysis using game theory approaches. Pruett-Jones S and Pruett-Jones M (1994) developed a game theory model to examine the question of why males should maraud each other and the clear result of their analysis was that under most circumstances (i.e., realistic values of parameters such as bower repair time and male residency), both bower destruction and decoration theft are evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) in comparison with just guarding a bower and not marauding.
In this paper, we develop a model to investigate the optimal amount of marauding behavior that males should exhibit given the reality that their time during the day is limited. We begin with the following logical background. Males spend time at their bower, but they also must spend some time away from their bowers to forage. Males can elect to spend additional time away from their bower trying to maraud a rival male's bower. Marauding will only succeed if the rival male is away from his bower. Each male thus faces a tradeoff: By trying to maraud a rival's bower, he may possibly succeed and decrease the competition when a female visits his bower to mate. However, marauding requires a longer absence from his own bower, which increases the chances that the male misses the female's visit and also the chances that his bower will be marauded by other males. This latter chance depends on the extent to which other males devote time to marauding attempts.
It follows, therefore, that in this tradeoff, the optimal time devoted to marauding by a male may depend on the choice of marauding efforts by other males. In other words, neighboring males are engaged in a strategic interaction, in which optimal reactions are codetermined. If the time each male invests in marauding attempts is optimal vis-a-vis the other's, then the males' marauding expenditures constitute a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, the Nash equilibrium is strict (i.e., any unilateral deviation from it yields a strict loss to the deviator) if and only if the equilibrium strategy profile is an ESS profile (Weibull 1995, proposition 5.1) . Our model examines the Nash equilibrium strategy profiles in this contest.
MODEL
First, a note on terminology. Bower marauding is a general term that can refer to both the partial or the complete destruction of a bower or the theft of decorations at a bower. In this model, we use the term to refer specifically to the partial or complete destruction of a bower.
We imagine 2 males, i = 1,2 each of which needs to spend a fraction e of the day in foraging. Each male further chooses to spend a fraction m i of the day trying to maraud the other male's bower. Marauding is successful only if the other male is away from his bower, for foraging or marauding. If a bower gets marauded, the owner works on rebuilding it (and does not leave the bower for foraging during that time). It takes q hours on average to restore a bower.
A female visits the area at a random point in time, but we imagine that she assesses both males. If both males are at their bower and the bowers are intact, the female copulates with one of the males, each with probability 1 2 . If only one male is at his intact bower, whereas the other male is either away from his bower or his bower is not intact, the female copulates with the former male with probability 1. If neither of the males has an intact bower when the female arrives, the female does not mate but returns again at a future random time.
The strategic interaction between the males is therefore modeled by a stochastic game with 4 states (Figure 1 ). In state 1, both bowers are intact; in state 2, only male 1's bower is intact; in state 3, only male 2's bower is intact; and in state 4, neither bower is intact. The transition between states occurs once each hour. Thus, at the beginning of each hour, each male makes a decision-to forage, maraud, or remain at his bower unless his bower is marauded in which case the male is repairing it. The decisions of the males are simultaneous, and each male does not know what the other male has chosen. The probability that the male decides to forage is e and the probability the male decides to maraud is m i A time step of 1 hour is a stylistic simplification more than a realistic description of bowerbird behavior. Nevertheless, the model would be identical if the relevant time step (the maximum pace with which a male is typically able to alternate between guarding, foraging, or marauding) were longer or shorter; the only difference would be that the average time q to rebuild a marauded bower would have to be denominated in multiples of this time step. Hence, such a change would not alter the qualitative predictions of the model.
From state 1, a transition to state 2 occurs if male 1 marauds and male 2 sets out foraging (probability em 1 ). Similarly, a transition from state 1 to state 3 occurs if male 1 forages and male 2 marauds (probability em 2 ). A transition from state 1 to state 4 occurs if both males simultaneously maraud one another's bowers (probability m 1 m 2 ).
From state 2, a transition to state 1 occurs if male 2 succeeds to rebuild his bower (probability r ¼ 1 q ). Similarly, the system moves from state 3 to state 1 if male 1 manages to rebuild his bower (probability r). Finally, from state 4, in which both bowers are marauded, the system can move either to state 2 if only male 1 succeeds to rebuild his bower (probability r (12 r)), to state 3 if only male 2 succeeds to restore his bower (probability r (12r) or to state 1 if both males succeed to restore their bower (probability r 2 ). The following matrix P is hence the matrix of transition probabilities: the entry P kl of the matrix in row k and column l is the transition probability from state k to state l. This stochastic process is Markovian and ergodic (see e.g., Ross 1995) and hence has a stationary distribution p = (p 1 ,p 2 ,p 3 ,p 4 ): No matter what state the system starts in, the fraction of time it will spend in state k (k = 1, . . ., 4) will converge to p k with probability 1. This stationary distribution is a left eigenvector of the matrix P corresponding to the eigenvalue 1, that is, p satisfies 
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or in matrix notation
The unique eigenvector p that satisfies
2 r 2 1 m1ð2e 1 m2 2 re 2 rm2Þ 1 m2ð2e 1 m1 2 re 2 rm1Þ 1 m1m2 ; p 2 ¼ m1ð2e 1 m2 2 re 2 rm2Þ 2r 2 r 2 1 m1ð2e 1 m2 2 re 2 rm2Þ 1 m2ð2e 1 m1 2 re 2 rm1Þ 1 m1m2 ; p 3 ¼ m2ð2e 1 m1 2 re 2 rm1Þ 2r 2 r 2 1 m1ð2e 1 m2 2 re 2 rm2Þ 1 m2ð2e 1 m1 2 re 2 rm1Þ 1 m1m2 ; p 4 ¼ m1m2 2r 2 r 2 1 m1ð2e 1 m2 2 re 2 rm2Þ 1 m2ð2e 1 m1 2 re 2 rm1Þ 1 m1m2 :
Notice further that out of the time spent in a state k, the fraction q k of time in which neither male is at an intact bower (due to foraging/marauding or the need to restore the bower) is irrelevant for the competition between the males: If the female arrives when neither male has a bower to present, she will return again at a future random time. Therefore, for computing the expected fitness of each male, we take into consideration only the fraction of time 1 2 q k in each state k = 1, . . ., 4 in which at least one of the males has an intact bower.
In state 1, neither male is present at their bower with probability (e 1 m 1 )(e 1 m 2 ); in state 2, neither male will mate when male 1 is foraging (probability e); in state 3, neither male will mate when male 2 is foraging (probability e); in state 4, neither male will mate as neither male has an intact bower. The probabilities q k are therefore
We now proceed to calculate male 1's expected fitness. If the female arrives when the system is in state 1, the female will copulate with male 1 if he is at his bower and male 2 is away from his bower (probability (e 1 m 2 )(1 2 e 2 m 1 )); she will copulate with male 1 with probability 1 2 if both males are at their bowers (probability (1 2 e 2 m 1 )(1 2 e 2 m 2 )). Thus, at state 1, male 1's expected fitness is
If the female arrives when the system is in state 2, the female will copulate with male 1 if he is at his bower (probability 1 2 e), so that is also male 1's fitness in state 2. If the female arrives when the system is in state 3 or in state 4, she will not copulate with male 1 because he has no bower to present in these states.
Summing up, male 1's overall expected fitness is
Similarly, male 2's expected fitness is
Obviously,
because the female always ends up copulating with exactly one of the males. This is hence a constant-sum game, in which the interests of the males are strictly opposed.
Proposition 1 (unique ESS and its properties)
If the average time q to rebuild a marauded bower is relatively short, q , 1 eð12eÞ ; then the game between the males has a unique ESS, in which the males do not maraud at all. In the opposite case, when the time q to rebuild a bower satisfies q . 1 eð12eÞ ; then the game has a unique ESS in which both males maraud as much as they can. In the knife-edge case in which q ¼ 1 eð12eÞ ; every profile of marauding intensities is a Nash equilibrium but none is an ESS.
Proof
For a given marauding intensity m 2 of male 2, the slope of male 1's fitness as a function of his marauding strategy m 1 is given by One can verify that g(r,e,m 2 ) 0 in the relevant range of parameters, that is, when the probability of rebuilding a destroyed bower satisfies 0 , r 1, and the overall fraction of time e 1 m 2 that male 2 spends away from his bower satisfies 0 , e 1 m 2 1. Moreover, the denominator of ; then @f1 @m1 ,0 for every relevant m 2 (satisfying 0 , e 1 m 2 1). In this case, the unique fitness-maximizing strategy for male 1 is to choose m 1 = 0 no matter what marauding strategy male 2 chooses. By the symmetry of the problem between the 2 males, the same is true for male 2: m 2 = 0 is the unique fitness-maximizing strategy for male 2 irrespective of male 1's strategy. Hence, (m 1 ,m 2 ) = (0,0) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. Because this Nash equilibrium is also Pruett-Jones and Heifetz • Bowerbird marauding behavior 609 strict, this is also the unique ESS profile of the game. . 0 for every m 2 satisfying 0 , e 1 m 2 1. The unique fitness-maximizing strategy for male 1 in this case is to choose the maximal feasible level of marauding m 1 = 1 2 e no matter what marauding strategy male 2 chooses. Again by symmetry, m 2 = 1 2 e is the unique fitness-maximizing strategy for male 2 irrespective of male 1's strategy. Hence, (m 1 ,m 2 ) = (1 2 e, 1 2 e) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. As it is a strict Nash equilibrium, it is also the unique ESS profile of the game. Figure 3 depicts f 1 for the case in which e = 0.3 and q = 6. For this combination of parameters, m 1 = 1 2 e = 0.7 maximizes f 1 for each feasible marauding strategy m 2 of male 2, and m 2 = 1 2 e = 0.7 minimizes f 1 (and hence maximizes f 2 = 1 2 f 1 ) for each marauding strategy m 1 of male 1.
Case 3: In the borderline case in which r = e(12e) m 2 ) . Hence, every marauding strategy is just as good as any other for male 1, and by symmetry, the same holds for male 2. This means that every strategy profile (m 1 ,m 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium of the game. However, none of these Nash equilibria is strict, and hence, in this knife-edge case, the game has no ESS profile.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. If it is relatively easy and quick to restore a destroyed bower (case 1), marauding conveys little benefit and is not worth its cost (a chance of missing the female's visit and increasing the time one's own bower is left unguarded); hence, marauding is avoided. In the opposite case, in which restoring a bower requires a significant length of time (case 2), the males would try to gain an advantage by marauding one another's bower whenever they can. The borderline case 3 is not empirically relevant because it requires an exceptional coincidence of parameter values.
Another perspective on this result is the following. The expression 1 eð12eÞ is minimal (and equals 4 h) when the fraction e of the day spent on foraging equals (Figure 4 ). This means, first, that when q , 4, case 1 occurs and no marauding would take place at an ESS. Second, for any given average restoring time q . 4, if the fraction of time e needed for foraging is very small, then case 1 occurs as well, with no marauding at an ESS. Indeed, if the minimal mandatory absence from the bower needed for foraging is short, a marauding attempt might be likely to fail (because most of the time the rival male could be guarding his bower), and hence, marauding would not be worth its cost. Thus, for instance, if the males develop techniques to shorten their foraging time, for example, caching food close to the bower (Pruett-Jones MA and Pruett-Jones SG 1985; Frith CB and Frith DW 2004) , the new ESS might be beneficial not only unilaterally but also jointly, with peaceful coexistence instead of intensive marauding. No marauding would occur as an ESS at the other extreme as well, in which 1's fitness f 1 as a function of the fractions m 1 ,m 2 of the day in which males 1 and 2, respectively, try to maraud the other's bower, for the case in which the fraction of time they must devote to foraging is e = 0.3, and the average time to rebuild a marauded bower is q = 2 h. For this combination of parameters, m 1 = 0 maximizes f 1 for each feasible marauding strategy m 2 of male 2 and m 1 = 0 minimizes f 1 (and hence maximizes male 2's fitness f 2 = 1 2 f 1 ) for each marauding strategy m 1 of male 1.
Figure 3
Male 1's fitness f 1 for the case in which e = 0.3 and q = 6 h. For this combination of parameters, m 1 = 1 2 e = 0.7 maximizes f 1 for each feasible marauding strategy m 2 of male 2, and m 2 = 1 2 e = 0.7 minimizes f 1 (and hence maximizes f 2 = 1 2 f 1 ) for each marauding strategy m 1 of male 1. 
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Behavioral Ecology e is very large (Figure 4) , and males must spend most of the day foraging. In this case, the opportunity cost of marauding is large (and hence avoided) because the male is seldom at his bower, and further absences would reduce almost entirely his chances to be present at his bower when the female arrives. In contrast, for every q . 
Asymmetric mating probabilities
We now extend the model above to the more realistic scenario that because of differences in bower quality, the 2 males do not have equal probabilities of mating. Thus, we imagine the case that when a female visits the bowers when both males are present in state 1 (Figure 1 ), the female is more likely to copulate with male 1 than she is to copulate with male 2. Denoting the probability of the female mating with male 1 as s 1 . 1 2 , it follows that male 1's fitness in state 1 is now (e 1 m 2 )(1 2 e 2 m 1 ) 1 s 1 (1 2 e 2 m 1 ) and his overall fitness, across all states, is f1 À m1; m2 Á ¼ p1ððe 1 m2Þð1 2 e 2 m1Þ 1 s1ð1 2 e 2 m1Þð1 2 e 2 m2ÞÞ 1 p2ð1 2 eÞ p1ð1 2 q1Þ 1 p2ð1 2 q2Þ 1 p3ð1 2 q3Þ 1 p4ð1 2 q4Þ :
The fitness of male 2 is f 2 (m 1 ,m 2 ) = 1 2 f 1 (m 1 ,m 2 )because the female copulates with just one of the males.
How would this asymmetry in mating probabilities between the males influence the males' ESS profile? Intuitively, male 1 may care less about destroying his rival's bower given that male 1's bower is more attractive. In contrast, male 2 now has a higher incentive to destroy the bower of male 1, given that the bower of male 2 is less attractive. We check this intuition for the 2 scenarios depicted in the previous section.
When the fraction of time foraging is e = 0.3 and the average time to repair a bower is q = 2, the original ESS profile (when the bowers/males are equally attractive to females) was that both males should guard their bowers (m 1 = 0, m 2 = 0, Figure  2) . The situation is different in the present case, when the males differ in their probability of mating as illustrated in Figure 5 , which depicts male 1's fitness f 1 (m 1 ,m 2 ) for the case s 1 = 0.95. Guarding (m 1 = 0) still maximizes the fitness of male 1 regardless of the marauding intensity of male 2, and thus, m 1 = 0 is male 1's strategy in the ESS profile. However, now, the optimal behavior of male 2 is not m 2 = 0 (no marauding) but rather m 2 = 1 2 e = 0.7 as this minimizes f 1 (m 1 ,m 2 ) and thus maximizes male 2's fitness f 2 (m 1 ,m 2 ). The ESS profile in this case is asymmetric (m 1 = 0, m 2 = 0.7), that is, male 1 guards his bower (unless he is away foraging) and male 2 marauds at the highest possible intensity.
The outcome differs when the time to repair a marauded bower is longer. From Figure 3 , (e = 0.3,q = 6), the original ESS profile was that both males maraud as much as possible (m 1 = m 2 = 1 2 e = 0.7) under the assumption that the males mate with equal probability. Surprisingly, we find exactly the same result in the present case, where the probabilities of mating differ between the males (s 1 = 0.95, Figure 6 ). As illustrated, regardless of the behavior of male 2, the fitness of male 1 is maximized when m 1 = 1 2 e = 0.7. The fitness of male 2 is maximized when that of male 1 is minimized and m 2 = 1 2 e = 0.7 minimizes male 1's fitness. Thus, m 1 = m 2 = 1 2 e = 0.7 is still the unique ESS.
Asymmetric bower-rebuilding proficiencies
We next analyze the case in which the average time q i it takes male i to restore a bower may be different between the 2 males. This could occur, for example, if bowers vary in their integrity such that it takes the owner of a well-built bower, a shorter period of time to repair it when the bower is marauded. Accordingly, we denote by r i ¼ 1 q i ; the probability that male i succeeds in restoring his bower in a state in which it is destroyed. In this case, the matrix of transition probabilities of the stochastic game would be This stochastic process is Markovian and ergodic as well, and its stationary distribution (p 1 ,p 2 ,p 3 ,p 4 ) satisfies Figure 5 Male 1's fitness f 1 as a function of the fractions m 1 ,m 2 of the day in which males 1 and 2, respectively, try to maraud the other's bower, for the case in which the fraction of time they must devote to foraging is e = 0.3, the average time to rebuild a marauded bower is q = 6 h and the likelihood of male 1 mating is s 1 = 0.95.
Figure 6
Male 1's fitness f 1 f 1 as a function of the fractions m 1 ,m 2 of the day in which males 1 and 2, respectively, try to the other's bower, for the case in which the fraction of time they must devote to foraging is e = 0.3, the average time to rebuild a marauded bower is q = 6 h and the likelihood of male 1 mating is s 1 = 0.95.
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In the particular case in which q 1 = q 2 (and hence r 1 = r 2 ), this stationary distribution is the one analyzed in the symmetric case and proposition 1 obtains. In the asymmetric case, the fitness functions f 1 (m 1 ,m 2 ) and f 2 (m 1 ,m 2 ) remain as in ð1Þ and ð2Þ above but with the amended values of (p 1 ,p 2 ,p 3 ,p 4 ).
For some asymmetric bower-rebuilding proficiencies, q 1 , q 2 , at the unique ESS, the more proficient male marauds as much as possible and the less proficient male does not maraud at all. Figure 7 depicts male 1's expected fitness f 1 (m 1 ,m 2 ) assuming that the males need to devote 30% of the day for foraging (e = 0.3), that male 1 requires 3 h on average to restore his bower if and when it is marauded (q 1 = 3), and male 2 needs 5 h on average to restore his bower (q 2 = 5). The fitness surface (Figure 6 ) demonstrates that male 1's fitness increases with the fraction m 1 of the time that he devotes to marauding, up to the maximal possible level (m 1 = 1 2 e = 0.7 in this example) for every feasible marauding level of male 2.
Hence, male 1's optimal level of marauding is at the maximal level m 1 = 0.7.
In contrast, male 2 tries to maximize his expected fitness f 2 (m 1 ,m 2 ) = 1 2 f 1 (m 1 ,m 2 ), that is, to minimize male 1's fitness. This minimum is attained at m 2 = 0 for every feasible marauding level of male 1, and hence, m 2 = 0 is optimal for male 2 irrespective of male 1's behavior. Hence, (m 1 ,m 2 ) = (0.7,0) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. Moreover, because this Nash equilibrium is strict, this is the unique ESS of the game. At this ESS (on the far right end of the graph), male 1's expected fitness f 1 (0.7,0) is larger than 1 2 and hence larger than male 2's fitness f 2 (0.7,0) = 1 2 f 1 (0.7,0).
DISCUSSION
Bower marauding is a complex behavior by male bowerbirds but also one that has been observed in every species of bowerbird (bower building species) studied to date (Frith CB and Frith DW 2004 ). It appears that despite the potential costs of this behavior, it pays males to attempt to reduce the ability of their neighbors to attract mates. In the original ''two-male'' game developed by Pruett-Jones S and Pruett-Jones M (1994), a number of simplifying assumptions were made (e.g., that the bowers of all males were of equal ''quality'') but the results of that model were clear; bower marauding is an ESS compared with not marauding and just guarding a bower.
In the present model, we examine marauding behavior in a different manner, assuming that males are limited in the time each day that they can spend either foraging or visiting other males and then examining the optimal level of marauding behavior. The results of our initial model were that males should spend all of their available time marauding their neighbors but also that optimal behavior is critically dependent of the time it takes males to rebuild their bowers after marauding (relative to foraging time). When required foraging time is extremely low or extremely high (Figure 4) , zero marauding is the ESS; otherwise, maximal marauding is the optimal strategy. An additional, and unexpected, result is that under very specific circumstances, every strategy may be optimal, but this solution is not stable and should be expected to revert to either constant marauding or zero marauding behavior.
In the model by Pruett-Jones S and Pruett-Jones M (1994), although marauding was the ESS for most parameter values, there were circumstances in which guarding and not marauding could be an ESS. One specific case in which guarding or marauding comprised a mixed ESS was the situation when the time for a male to repair his bower was very short (less than 3 h). This is interesting because a similar time value (4 h) was found to be a critical value for bower repair Male 1's fitness in a case of asymmetric bower-rebuilding proficiencies, assuming that the males need to devote 30% of the day for foraging (e = 0.3), that male 1 requires 3 h on average to restore his bower if and when it is marauded (q 1 = 3), whereas male 2 needs 5 h on average to restore his bower (q 2 = 5). The graph demonstrates that male 1's fitness is increasing when he increases the fraction m 1 of the time that he devotes to marauding, up to the maximal possible level (m 1 = 1 2 e = 0.7) for every feasible marauding level of male 2. In contrast, it is m 2 = 0 which minimizes f 1 (and hence maximizes male 2's fitness f 2 = 1 2 f 1 ) for every feasible marauding level of male 1. p 1 ¼ r 1 r 2 ðr 1 1 r 2 2 r 1 r 2 Þ r 1 r 2 ðr 1 1 r 2 2 r 1 r 2 Þ 1 m 1 r 1 ðer 1 1 er 2 1 m 2 r 1 2 er 1 r 2 2 m 2 r 1 r 2 Þ 1 m 2 r 2 ðer 1 1 er 2 1 m 1 r 2 2 er 1 r 2 2 m 1 r 1 r 2 Þ 1 m 1 m 2 r 1 r 2 ; p 2 ¼ m 1 r 1 ðer 1 1 er 2 1 m 2 r 1 2 er 1 r 2 2 m 2 r 1 r 2 Þ r 1 r 2 ðr 1 1 r 2 2 r 1 r 2 Þ 1 m 1 r 1 ðer 1 1 er 2 1 m 2 r 1 2 er 1 r 2 2 m 2 r 1 r 2 Þ 1 m 2 r 2 ðer 1 1 er 2 1 m 1 r 2 2 er 1 r 2 2 m 1 r 1 r 2 Þ 1 m 1 m 2 r 1 r 2 ; p 3 ¼ m 2 r 2 ðer 1 1 er 2 1 m 1 r 2 2 er 1 r 2 2 m 1 r 1 r 2 Þ r 1 r 2 ðr 1 1 r 2 2 r 1 r 2 Þ 1 m 1 r 1 ðer 1 1 er 2 1 m 2 r 1 2 er 1 r 2 2 m 2 r 1 r 2 Þ 1 m 2 r 2 ðer 1 1 er 2 1 m 1 r 2 2 er 1 r 2 2 m 1 r 1 r 2 Þ 1 m 1 m 2 r 1 r 2 ;
612 Behavioral Ecology time in the current model even though our current model and that of Pruett-Jones S and Pruett-Jones M (1994) are entirely different in their basic construction. Bower repair time may be one of the most critical variables for individual males in terms of the costs/benefits of their own marauding behavior. The modifications of our basic model to incorporate asymmetries among the males in 1) mating probabilities and 2) bower repair time were made to incorporate the realistic scenarios that males almost certainly differ from each other in either or both bower quality and bower building skills (that may influence ease of restoring a damaged bower). The results of the first modification (mating probabilities) depended on bower repair time. When that time is short, the male most likely to mate should never maraud, whereas the other male should maraud at the maximal level. In contrast, when bower repair time is long, both males should maraud at the maximal level despite the fact that one male has a much greater chance of mating each time a female visits. This result was somewhat surprising but again points to the importance of bower repair time in influencing the dynamics of behavior in males.
The results of the second modification (bower repair asymmetries) were that the males should differ in their behavior; the male that is capable of rebuilding his bower more quickly should maraud at the maximal level, whereas the male that is slower at rebuilding his bower should never maraud. If rebuilding abilities reflect either behavioral dominance or male quality in general, this result indicates that better quality males should maraud their neighbors and lower quality males should not. On the other hand, higher quality males might build higher quality bowers that take longer to build and repair, and if this is the case, then the prediction is exactly the opposite as stated, namely that higher quality males should not maraud and lower quality males should. Obviously, simultaneous data are needed on male quality, bower quality, and bower repair time before the results of asymmetric models can be used to make explicit predictions.
In the present model, we examined optimal marauding behavior but restricted our model to bower destruction (marauding) and did not include the theft of decorations. Pruett-Jones S and Pruett-Jones M (1994) showed that decoration theft was an ESS under a much wider range of conditions (parameter values) than simple bower marauding. The reasons for this are that decoration theft has a 2-fold impact. It reduces the attraction of a male's bower and simultaneously increases the attraction of the bower of the male that steals the decorations. Bower marauding per se has a less direct impact in that the marauding male's bower is not more attractive per se, but the marauding male is available to interact with females during the time the male that was marauded is repairing his bower. Across populations and across species, rates of bower marauding and decoration theft vary widely (Frith CB and Frith DW 2004; Madden 2006; Doerr 2010b ). Within at least 1 species (great bowerbirds [Ptilonorhynchus nuchalis]; Doerr 2010a), there was a positive relationship between the rates of decoration theft and bower marauding. Across species, however, this relationship is negative; in species in which males steal decorations at a rapid rate, the males do not spend much time marauding the bower, and vice versa (Pruett-Jones S and Madden J in preparation).
Rates of bower marauding are available for many species (Frith CB and Frith DW 2004) , but data on bower repair time and time budgets relative to the amount of time that males spend marauding each other have not been quantified for any species that we are aware of. Thus, there are few available data to test the predictions of our model explicitly. If the results of our model can be generalized to include decoration theft, which we acknowledge is an untested assumption, there are relevant data because decoration theft has been the focus of many studies of behavioral interactions among males. For example, our asymmetric model predicts that there should be a negative relationship between the rate at which a male marauds other males and the rate at which the male's own bower is marauded. Doerr (2010a) reports no such relationship for theft of decorations among male great bowerbirds but does show a strong relationship with male tenure at his bower. There was a negative relationship between years of ownership and the rate the male suffered decoration theft (Doerr 2010a) , indicating that a male's ability to guard his bower (or repel intruders) increases with age. This result suggests that there are indeed asymmetries between males and their neighbors.
We modeled male interactions as occurring between just 2 neighboring males. In reality, of course, male bowerbirds would interact with a neighborhood of males. Borgia and Gore (1986) , Madden et al. (2004) , and Wojcieszek et al. (2007) report positive relationships between stealing rates among neighboring male bowerbirds in that the most active thieves were most frequently stolen from themselves (see also Borgia 1985b) . Although these data do not directly support the assumption of our basic model, that interactions among males are based on individual dyads, they do suggest that within a neighborhood, males interact with each other in different manners. Extending the results of our model to a larger set of males, it is possible that some dyads of males leave each other's bowers alone (as optimal behavior), whereas in other dyads, the males attempt to exhibit optimal behavior by regularly marauding each other's bowers. Reynolds et al. (2009) report that variation in marauding rates in the satin bowerbird (P. violaceus) is due to genetic relatedness among males. Among neighboring males, a given male marauded relatives less than nonrelatives (Reynolds et al. 2009 ). This result is remarkable given that male bowerbirds do not interact with the nestlings that they sire and would not have the opportunity to interact with male relatives until those relatives become bower owners by which time those males are several years old. Reynolds et al. (2009) acknowledge that they do not know the mechanism by which males recognize relatives but suggest that it may be related to self-referent phenotype matching and odor released from the ''paint'' that males apply to their bowers. In contrast to these results, Madden et al. (2004) report that in the spotted bowerbird (Chlamydera maculata), males do not maraud less related males more often than expected by chance. Doerr (2010a) showed that male great bowerbirds vary in the number of decorations at their bowers and their ability to protect the bowers from decoration theft and argued that decoration numbers are an honest signal of the male's ability to guard his bower. Data such as these clearly show that males vary in their ability to protect their bowers as implied in our asymmetric model. So does the suggestion that variation in decoration number reflects ''social control'' of signal honesty by males (Madden 2002; but see Doerr 2010b ). Borgia and Gore (1986) and Wojcieszek et al. (2007) document that males form ''stealing relationships'' with other males in that males steal decorations from specific males.
In summary, our models suggest that the optimal marauding strategies of male bowerbirds can vary dramatically depending on bower repair time, variation in attractiveness of males (likelihood of mating), and variation in a male's ability to repair his own bower quickly. The fact that there are multiple ESS solutions to the same problem (how much time to devote to marauding) suggests that interactions among male bowerbirds may be specific to a particular pair of males. Males could interact with different rivals in very different manners. 
